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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

The hesitation of the courts in past decisions in affording too liberal an
interpretation of the language of the Act is undoubtedly a repercussion
of a fear that a contrary holding would result in persons obtaining relief
who were not contemplated by the legislature to be entitled to relief.
The decision in the instant case allows recovery in an area where recovery has been heretofore denied. In the past, courts have limited recovery
to those persons injured by a mob who were charged, or at least suspected
of some crime. Now, the boundary lines of recovery have been extended
to include those instances where an injury resulted when a mob was acting to protect what it believed was a "community interest."
There is evidence of the court's hesitation to allow any interpretation
of its decision as a change or exception to any established legal concepts.
The court stated:
We are of the opinion that it was the legislative intent in enacting the law
to impose a penalty upon the community in the form of additional taxes when
its members 23participate in or allow the condition to arise that we find in the
instant case.

It is to be remembered that the plaintiff here has not yet won his case.
The decision that he has made out a prinma facie case under the statute is a
major hurdle. It is submitted that the court in the instant case has correctly effectuated the intent of the legislature in the application of the statute.
The original purpose of the Act was to counteract strike violence and
lynching. It can reasonably be said that these activities and the activities
of the mob in the instant case are akin. Both are a dangerous disruption of
law and order. Both can easily become uncontrollable. Both are inclined
to cause serious bodily harm to innocent persons. If mob action is to be
conquered by a pecuniary penalty on the community, it would seem that
this case should occasion a valid infliction of that penalty.
PROPERTY-MURDER BY JOINT TENANT EXTINGUISHES RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP
Lawrence and Matilda Fox, husband and wife, were owners of certain
real property which they held in joint tenancy. Lawrence Fox murdered
his wife and three days later conveyed the premises. Fox was convicted of
the murder and sentenced to the State Penitentiary.
The administrator of the estate of the decedent and her daughter by
the common law should be strictly construed (if not both penal and remedial in
character).
23
Slaton v. City of Chicago, 8 11. App. 2d 47, 59, 130 N.E. 2d 205, 211 (1955). Emphasis added.
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a former marriage brought an action against Lawrence Fox to establish a
constructive trust in the property formerly held in joint tenancy by
defendant and decedent. The plaintiffs also sought to recover damages
for the wrongful death of the decedent. The circuit court of Winnebago
County sustained defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, and rendered judgment against plaintiffs, from which they appealed directly to
the Supreme Court of Illinois. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that defendant, by his felonious act, destroyed all his
rights of survivorship as joint tenant and only retained title to an undivided half interest in the property as a tenant in common with plaintiffdaughter as decedent's heir-at-law. 1 Bradley v. Fox, 7 111. 2d 106, 129 N.E.
2d 699 (1955).

The Supreme Court of Illinois thereby overruled its earlier decision in
Welsh v. James.2 In that case, it refused to divest a husband who murdered his wife of title to real and personal property which was held by
them jointly. The decision in the Welsh case was based upon the legal
concept that defendant, as a joint tenant, was seized of the whole estate
by virtue of the original grant and could not be divested therefrom by
the imposition of a constructive trust, without violating the constitutional
provision against corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.8 The court
also relied upon a previous Illinois case which held that under the Illinois
statutes of descent a murderer could inherit from his victim since there
was no legislative prohibition against it.4
An estate in joint tenancy is an estate held by two or more jointly, with
an equal right in all to share in the enjoyment of the land during their
lives.5 Survivorship is the distinctive characteristic of an estate in joint
1 The court also held that the lower court erred in denying plaintiff's claim for
damages for decedent's wrongful death. The defendant argued that since he was one
of the class of beneficiaries under the Wrongful Death Act (ill. Rev. Star., 1953,
c. 70, S2), his act barred other beneficiaries from recovering. Defendant relied upon
Hazel v. Hoopeston-Danville Motor Bus Co., 310 111.38, 141 N.E. 392, 30 A.L.R.
491 (1923), wherein it was held that the contributory negligence of one of the beneficiaries precluded all the beneficiaries from recovering. The court rejected this argument, stating that since defendant was the sole wrongdoer, his felonious conduct would
not bar the other beneficiaries from recovering. See also Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill. 130,
101 N.E. 2d 547 (1951); and Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 I11. 2d 608, 131 N.E. 2d 525 (1956).
2408 Ill. 18, 95 N.E. 2d 872 (1950).
3 "All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense, and no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate ... " (Constitution of 1870,
art. 11, § 11).

4 Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 111.180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914). However, the result of the
Wall decision was modified by statute in 1939 (111. Rev. Stat. 1939, c. 3, § 167) which
provides that a person convicted of murder shall not inherit from his victim and that
the victim's estate be distributed as though the murderer had predeceased his victim.
57 R.C.L. 811.
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tenancy.' On the death of a joint tenant, the survivors take the whole
estate, 7 free from the claims of the heirs or creditors of the deceased cotenant.8 The joint tenant who survives does not take the share of the other
free from him as successor, but by right under the conveyance, which
created the joint tenancy in the first instance. 9 Where husband and wife
hold property in joint tenancy, the right of survivorship of one joint
tenant does not arise out of the marriage relationship. 10
At common law four coexisting unities are necessary and requisite to
the creation and continuance of a joint tenancy; namely, unity of interest,
unity of title, unity of time, and unity of possession. Illinois Supreme
Court decisions abound with cases that refer to the four unities," and the
words of the Supreme Court of Illinois in the Bradley case indicate its
awareness of that common law requirement.'2 Therefore, any act of a
joint tenant which destroys any of these unities operates as a severance
of the joint tenancy and extinguishes the right of survivorship.'2 Whoever
acquires the interest of that joint tenant becomes a tenant in common
with the other tenants.' 4 The court in the instant case concluded that
defendant Fox had, by his felonious act, destroyed the four unities requisite to the continuance of the joint tenancy and thereby severed the joint
tenancy and extinguished his right of survivorship.
But regard for the sanctity of technical rules relating to property law
0
Welsh v. James, 408 Ill. 18, 95 N.E. 2d 872 (1950); Dolley v. Powers, 404 I11.510,
89 NE 2d 412 (1949); Kane v. Johnson, 397 Ill. 112, 73 N.E. 2d 321 (1947); Porter v.
Porter, 381 Ill. 322, 45 N.E. 2d 635 (1942).

7

Porter v. Porter, 381 Ill. 322, 45 N.E. 2d 635 (1942); People v. Varel, 351 Il1. 96,

184 N.E. 209 (1932).
8Spikings v. Ellis, 290 Ill. App. 585, 8 N.E. 2d 962 (1937).

Klajbor v. Klabjor, 406 11. 513, 94 N.E. 2d 502 (1950).
Ill. 104, 37 N.E. 2d 826 (1941).
11 Schuck v. Schuck, 413 IIl. 390, 108 N.E. 2d 905 (1952); Porter v. Porter, 381 111.
322, 45 N.E. 2d 635 (1942); Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Il1.437, 163 N.E. 327 (1928).
12 "It is fundamental that four coexisting unities are necessary and requisite to the
creation and continuance of a joint tenancy . . ." Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill. 2d 106, 118,
0

10 Duncan v. Suhy, 378

129 N.E. 2d 699, 705 (1955). But see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, c. 76, § 2.1, "Whenever

a transfer of tangible or intangible personal property shall be made in which the
estate or interest created shall be declared to be an estate or interest not in tenancy
in common, but in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, notwithstanding the fact
that the transferor is or the transferors are also named as a transferee or as transferees, the estate or interest so created shall have all the effects of a common-law joint
tenancy estate."
' 8 Klouda v. Pechousek, 414 I11.75, 110 N.E. 2d 258 (1953); Schuck v. Schuck, 413
Ill. 390, 108 N.E. 2d 905 (1952); Van Antwerp v. Horan, 390 Ill. 449, 61 N.E. 2d 358
(1945).
14 Porter v. Porter, 381 Ill. 322, 45 N.E. 2d 635 (1942); Liese v. I-entze, 326 111.633,
158 N.E. 428 (1927); Partridge v. Berliner, 325 Il. 253, 156 N.E. 352 (1927).
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was only a secondary consideration in the determination of the instant
case. The court was primarily motivated by a desire to properly construe
the right of survivorship in the light of prevailing public policy. The
court pointed out that by statute in Illinois a convicted murderer is prohibited from inheriting from his victim. 15 The court stated that this
statute, "... while not determinative of the rights of the parties in this

situation, does evince a legislative policy to deny a convicted murderer
the fruits of his crime."'16
Also, in insurance cases, where the beneficiary or heir under a life insurance policy murdered the assured to acquire the proceeds of the
policy, Illinois courts have construed insurance contracts as though public
policy, and the common-law maxim that no man shall profit by his own
wrong were part of the contract and denied recovery on the policy to
17
the murderer or his heirs.
The court refused to apply, as did the court in Welsh v. James,"' the
legal fiction ". . . that a joint tenant holds the entire property at the date

of the original conveyance, and acquires no additional interest by virtue
of the felonious death of his cotenant .. ."19 Rather, it was noted that
before the murder, defendant, as a joint tenant, had to share the profits of
the property, and his right to complete ownership was contingent upon
surviving his wife; whereas, after, and because of, his felonious act that
contingency was removed, and he became the sole owner of the property.
To sanction this would thwart a sound judicial and legislative policy
against allowing a criminal to profit by his crime.
Other jurisdictions have treated this problem of survivorship in various
ways. Some courts have held that the murderer is entitled to succeed to
the whole estate just as he would have under ordinary circumstances.
They have based their decisions on the grounds of a lack of statutory
authority to do otherwise, 20 or because of constitutional provisions against
15 Ill. Rev. Star. 1939, 1953, chap. 3, par. 167, "A person who is convicted of the
murder of another shall not inherit from the murdered person or acquire as surviving spouse or otherwise under this Act any interest in the estate of the decedent by
reason of the death, but the estate of the decedent descends and shall be distributed
in the same manner as if the person who murdered the decedent died before the decedent."
16 Bradley v. Fox, 7 111.2d 106, 116, 129 N.E. 2d 699, 705 (1955).
17 Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n v. Collins, 341 111.548, 173 N.E. 465 (1930); Supreme
Lodge Knights & Ladies of Honor v. Menkhausen, 209 I1. 277, 70 N.E. 567 (1904).
18408 11. 18, 95 N.E. 2d 872 (1950).

19 Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill. 2d 106, 116, 129 N.E. 2d 699, 705 (1955).
20Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P 2d 514, 520 (1950), quoting Walton v.
Walton, 86 Colo. 1, 14, 278 P. 780, 784 (1929), ". . . the question of public policy is
for the Legislature. When that policy is unequivocally declared, the declaration binds
the courts"; Di Lallo v. Corea, 19 Pa. D.&C. 282 (Penna., 1932).
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corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate, 2 1 and also to avoid interference with vested legal rights. 22
2
Other courts have allowed the murderer to retain his interest only; 3
while other decisions have held that one who murders his joint tenant is
entitled to nothing, and, by his deed, sacrifices all of his prior interest in
24
the joint holdings. The decisions include cases involving real property,
both realty and personalty,2 5 and personal property only. 26 One court, in
effect, deprived the killer of the entire estate by the equitable expedient
of imposing a constructive trust on the entire estate held by the murderer
27
for the benefit of the heirs of his victim.
Other courts have imposed a constructive trust modified by a life
2
interest in half the property.
Illinois, as exemplified by the Bradley decision, has concluded that a
joint tenant who murders the other tenant thereby destroys all rights of
survivorship and becomes a tenant in common with the heir-at-law of the
deceased tenant. This seems an altogether reasonable viewpoint in that
21 Welsh v. James, 408 Il. 18, 95 N.E. 2d 872 (1950); Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907).
22 Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935).
23 Cowan v. Pleasant, 263 S.V. 2d 494, 32 A.L.R. 2d 1099 (1954). A husband and
wife held real estate as tenants by the entireties. The husband killed his wife, then
himself. One-half of the property was given to the heirs of the husband and one-half
to the heirs of the wife; Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W. 2d 464 (1948).
One-half of the real estate held as a tenancy by the entireties to the heirs of the wife,
and one-half to the husband who murdered her; Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913,
27 S.W. 2d 757 (1930). The court divided the fee and permitted the wrongdoing
spouse to retain one-half as if a divorce had occurred.
24 Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y.S. 173 (1918). The property was
held in tenancy by the entireties.
25 In re King's Estate (Lore v. Habermeyer), 261 Wis. 266, 52 N.W. 2d 885 (1952);
Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 App. Div. 87, 279 N.Y.S. 176 (4th Dept. 1935). Real property
and bank accounts held in joint tenancy.
2
GMerrity v. Prudential Ins. Co., 110 N.J. 414, 166 A. 335 (1933); Spicer v. New
York Life Ins. Co. (C.A. 5th, 1920) 268 F. 500, cert. denied 255 U.S. 572, 41 S.Ct. 376;
Matter of Santouran's Estate, 125 Misc. 668, 212 N.Y.S. 116 (1925).
27 Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 295, 54 N.W. 2d 385 (1952) The court reasoned that
this does not interfere with any vested legal rights yet it gives effect to the appealing
doctrine that a person should not be permitted to profit by his own wrong.
28 Neiman v. Hurff, 11 N.J. 55, 93 A. 2d 345 (1952). The murderer was allowed to
hold the realty and corporate stock formerly held in a tenancy by the entireties, in
trust, subject to a lien thereon for the commuted value at the time of decedent's
death of the net income of one-half from both for the number of years of his expectancy of life as determined according to the mortality tables; Colton v. Wade, 32
DeI.Ch. 122, 80 A. 2d 923 (1951). The survivor was held entitled to the commuted
value of the net income of one-half of the realty for the number of years of his expectancy of life; Bryant, v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188, (1927). The defendant
held the entire estate in trust for his deceased wife's heirs-at-law subject to his own
life interest in one-half.
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the murderer is thereby precluded from profiting from his crime and yet
has not been denied his constitutional rights as regard forfeiture of his
estate.
PROPERTY-EQUITABLE RELIEF ALLOWED FOR
IMPROVEMENTS MADE UNDER THE MISTAKEN BELIEF OF OWNERSHIP
Plaintiff secured a building permit to construct a dwelling on lot 15
and immediately commenced construction on lot 16, which was adjacent,
under the mistaken belief that he was on lot 15. Upon discovering his
mistake a month later, he undertook to purchase lot 16 from the owner
and continued construction on the dwelling. After a few weeks time had
elapsed, and the building was near completion, plaintiff received from the
defendant lot-owner a demand to suspend construction, with which he
complied. Plaintiff then filed suit in equity, alleging the mistake and praying that defendant be required to purchase the improvements placed on
lot 16 or to convey said lot to the plaintiff at its reasonable value. The
chancellor's degree sustained plaintiff's prayer, ordering the parties to exchange deeds; and the defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed the decree of the trial court. Voss v. Forgue, 84 So. 2d 563 (Fla.,
1956).
At common law, even in equity, improvements of a permanent nature
placed on or attached to land without the consent of the owner became
part of the realty and title thereto vested in the owner.' The rationale
underlying the common-law rule, as stated in the Restatement of the Law
of Restitution, is that one who intermeddles with the property of another
assumes the risk as to his right to do so. 2
The common-law rule is not wholly consistent with the principles of
restitution for mistake; but its harshness to the improver, acting under
the mistaken belief of ownership, has been greatly relieved, either in
equity or by statute.8
The leading case among those following the common-law doctrine, and
thus, denying the right to recover for improvements made on another's
land in the mistaken belief of ownership, is the frequently cited decision
of Putnam v. Ritchie, which held that the court was not authorized to
introduce a new principle into the law (that of allowing recovery based
on mistake) without the sanction of the legislature; and on this basis, the
4
court declined to grant relief to the improver.
1 McCreary v. Lake Boulevard Sponge Exchange Co., 133 Fla. 740, 183 So. 7 (1938).
2

Restatement of the Law of Restitution, § 42 (Comment "a").

3 Ibid.

4 6 Paige (N.Y.) 390 (1837).

